

Emergent cooperative behavior in transient compartments

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L. Peliti, A. Fierro, JJA, A. Coniglio
Napoli 1996

As a consequence...

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- And learned a few tricks:



Cooperation and network reciprocity

- Cooperation may emerge from selfish behavior! **How?**
- Several proposed mechanisms: kin selection, direct or indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, etc.
- **Network reciprocity** depends on the spatial correlations generated from continued interactions (persistent groups)
- the mutual protection from other cooperators in the bulk outweighs the exploitation on the surface



Prisoner's Dilemma game (PD)

	C	D
C	$b - c$	$-c$
D	b	0

benefit ($b > c$)

cost ($c > 0$)

- Replicator equation:

$$\dot{\rho}_i = \rho_i (f_i - F)$$

average fitness: $F = f_C \rho_C + f_D \rho_D$


- Mean field (fully-mixed): **no cooperation!**

$$f_C = \frac{(N_C - 1)b - (N - 1)c}{N - 1} < F \implies \boxed{\rho_D \rightarrow 1}$$

$$f_D = \frac{bN_C}{N - 1} > F$$

Multilevel selection

- Natural selection may operate across different scales of organization, from the individual-level to higher orders involving groups of agents
- within-group and between-groups interactions:
 - structured populations
 - patchy environments and transient compartments
 - bottleneck processes
 - different social environments during lifetime (also due to mobility)
 - etc
- What is the role of the compartmental structure and its different levels of selection in scaffolding stable multicellular groups?



Agent-level dynamics: growth phase

- Compartment: fully mixed and replicator equation

$$f_C = b\rho - c$$

↑ average C payoff

\implies

$$\dot{\rho} = \rho(f_C - F) = -c\rho(1 - \rho)$$

↑ instantaneous average payoff

$$f_D = b\rho$$


- Variable population:

$$\frac{dN}{dt} = F(\rho) N \implies N_\infty = N_0 e^{\Phi(\rho_0)}$$

↑ fitness = payoff


- The accumulated fitness

$$\begin{aligned}\Phi(\rho_0) &= \int_0^\infty dt F(\rho) = - \int_{\rho_0}^{\rho_\infty} d\rho \frac{F(\rho)}{c\rho(1 - \rho)} \\ &= \frac{b - c}{c} \ln \frac{1 - \rho_\infty}{1 - \rho_0}\end{aligned}$$



Agent-level dynamics: growth phase

- $\rho_0 = 0$: no growth ($N_\infty = N_0$)
- $\rho_0 < 1$: mixed initial compartments ($\rho_\infty = 0$)



$$N_\infty = \frac{N_0}{(1 - \rho_0)^{b/c-1}} \implies N_{n,m} = \frac{n}{(1 - m/n)^{b/c-1}}$$

The final average number of defectors per compartment is

$$N_D(x) = \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \sum_{m=0}^{n-1} p_{n,m} N_{n,m}$$

- $\rho_0 = 1$: cooperators only survive if $m = n$


$$N_C(x) = \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} p_{n,n} N_{\max}$$

Group-level dynamics: coalescence phase

- After the growth phase:

$$N_D(x) = \sum_n \frac{1}{n!} \frac{\lambda^n n^{b/c}}{e^\lambda - 1} \sum_{m < n} \binom{n}{m} \frac{(1-x)^{n-m} x^m}{(n-m)^{b/c-1}}$$

$$N_C(x) = N_{\max} \frac{e^{\lambda x} - 1}{e^\lambda - 1}$$




- After the coalescence phase:


$$x' = \frac{N_C(x)}{N_C(x) + N_D(x)}$$

- Fixed points ($x = x' = x^*$) and stability: $\left. \frac{dx'}{dx} \right|_{x^*} = 1$

Phase diagram



Phase diagram: uniform compartment size



Conclusions

- Minimal model for a two-level selection mechanism:
 - fragmentation, growth and coalescence
- importance of finite size compartments and composition fluctuations for cooperation
- cooperation is possible in transient groups with mean-field internal interactions
- size diversity is important: pure **C** and coexistence phase

Happy birthday, Constantino!